Author: Sumkoski

Introduction

The current stage of globalization has brought to the fore the relations between the key actors of the global governance: states, international organizations, and non-state actors. At present, the sole and indisputable source of legitimacy is the people of a nation-state, who can bestow it on governments through elections and/or other means of expressing their will. In recent decades, however, there has been a continuous erosion of the nation-state role, with its mandates and powers being transferred to various quasi-state bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and independent agencies. In parallel, the influence of international organizations, transnational corporations and professional networks is growing. Most of them fail to conceptualize their own legitimacy, hence are often perceived as illegitimate by citizens of nation-states.

Until recently, the Washington Consensus was recognized by academia, governments, and experts as a universal model of public policy whose recommendations were prescribed for implementation by nation-states. Today, however, its value has been questioned both in theory and in practice. Under these conditions, alternatives to the Washington Consensus are emerging. The new “multinational normality” of global development of sovereign nations is not yet fully formed and agreed upon, although the key features are beginning to shape up. It is getting clear that the “old” institutions of global development governance will not be able to adjust to the new reality and become more inclusive, accountable and, therefore, legitimate in terms of decision-making and must recognize diversity of development paths of sovereign states. Today there are separate and competing versions of regional and global approaches to development that take into account the needs and preferences of sovereign states.

Global Neoliberal Agenda and the Nation-States

The introduction of various decentralized local, regional and global governance systems in the context of the paradigm of neoliberal globalism inevitably weakened the role of states. The result of such “destatization” is the weakening and even deprivation of states of their powers and mandates, with a gradual transfer of functions to unelected international or quasi-national bodies. More recently, this process has manifested itself in the transition from national to independent central banks, the creation of independent regulators, NGOs or the third sector, professional networks, etc. All of this was ultimately aimed at pushing back and weakening the states, which since Aristotle’s time until today have remained the only recognized source of legitimacy. This is the only level where nations can exercise accountable governance, legitimately self-organize and manage their own processes.

Meanwhile, in the field of international economic development, developing countries are once again turning to industrial policy reforms that allow for a greater role for the state. This practice is embedded in a broader theory of sovereign state development that brings together all sectoral economic, social and institutional approaches to restore the role of institutions, both formal and informal, and of nation states as a predominant development paradigm for 21st century.

In recent decades, significant efforts have been made to include the state and its institutions into economic development and growth models and to formulate relevant policy recommendations. These are found mainly in the works of proponents of a new multipolar world order. However, the Western neoliberal body of science is not devoid of such ideas, for instance, the new structural economics (Lin, 2012) or the concept of “binding constraints” and “growth diagnostics” (Hausmann, Pritchett & Rodrik, 2005). However, both are focused on improving the Western Bretton Woods institutions. Attempts at such reforms have so far failed, for example, the reform of the World Bank, based on the idea of “diversity of development paths” (Stiglitz, 2001; 2002). Such reforms have been stymied by Western political elites. Hence, the new doctrine of the sovereign state establishes a common framework for sovereign nation-states that are in search of their own political, social and economic development in a multipolar world, based on a realistic perspective on international relations.

Since the 1990s, neoliberalism has dominated everywhere, including international relations, global and state ideology, political and social institutions, economics, science and education. Neoliberal principles have been incorporated into the vast majority of national development strategies as state ideology. The crisis of the neoliberal worldview has created a vacuum not only in competing ideologies but also in the vision, strategies, practical skills and capabilities of implementing the doctrine of the sovereign state. This is due to neoliberal ideology and practice, which relegates nation-states to regional, purely executive functions without a policy-making role. This content-free governance, which has been provided precisely by purely executive functions and embodied in national educational systems, has resulted in the loss by sovereign nation-states of their ability to formulate, create and implement visions, strategies, plans and capabilities to fulfill their direct functions in a multipolar world.

An emerging multipolar world based on realism does not need a prescriptive ideology at the level of the nation-state, except for the fundamental one: the sovereign will of the people to establish and manage their own processes and to determine their way of life in accordance with their preferred norms and values. Is the doctrine of a sovereign state even necessary in this case? The answer is obvious: yes. The neoliberal “void,” in which the functions of the states were reduced to local administrators and executives of a globalist agenda for the benefit of the transnational corporations, has to be filled by restoring the lost capacities of nation-states. This in turn requires a rethinking and deeper analysis of the origins and goals of the nation-state through the prism of different historical eras — Aristotle’s ideas about state government and their implementation by Alexander the Great, the formation of medieval states, the line of behavior of nation-states in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The process of restoring the functions of the nation-state involves working along the entire vertical chain, starting from the adoption of its own ideology, strategy and plans, as well as strengthening the ability and capacity to ensure the political, economic and social development of its sovereign — the people.

Only one fundamental change, drawn from the theory and practice of the statehood, embedded in the doctrine of the sovereign state, will in turn affect all aspects of the sovereign-state such as its ideology, institutions, governance, and administration, as well as practices in economic, political, and social spheres. The state serves its sovereign, the people, rather than any “higher” international groups or global interests. Such a sovereign state doctrine provides the basis for developing equitable economic systems in each country that will best reflect its culture, traditions, natural and human potential. Without being ideologically and politically directive, such a model of the sovereign state allows the construction of any model, from public, state-led to private, market-led economy, including any intermediate variations of mixed economy models.

In order to identify more precisely the key areas that can serve as starting points for constructing visions, strategies, and operational plans for building a sovereign state vision, it is necessary to trace how the current level of “destatization” has been achieved under the hegemony of global neoliberalism.

Global Transfer and Dissipation of Neoliberal Models to Developing Countries

With globalization, contemporary attempts to project the so-called universal values in less developed countries are taking place in an era of unprecedented technological progress that has made communication and movement of people easier than ever before. The rise in global trade, investment, production and service value chains through the constant convergence of customs, trade and investment rules has led to greater economic integration, making the world “smaller,” “flatter” and a truly “global village.” This unprecedented technological and communicational progress, combined with the tectonic political changes of recent decades, has been marked by the continuous erosion of nation-states and the growing influence of international and nongovernmental organizations. In an attempt to capture the complexity of the neoliberal global governance J. Rosenau (1995) defines it as “conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity — from the family to the international organization — in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions” (Rosenau, 1995, p. 7). The competing and increasingly adversary ideas about ways of addressing these transnational repercussions brings to the foreground the strains and tensions in the relations between the key actors of the global governance such as states, international organizations, and non-state actors.

The recent rapid advancement through which information, communication, and transportation have accelerated, combined with economic and political globalization and internationalization have provided platform for the global dissipation of ideas and practices resulting in interdependencies between countries, with institutions and policies transferring between countries through policy transfer, convergence, and adaption (Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019; Trein, 2015). While globalization focuses on increasing cross-border transactions that transcend borders by reducing barriers to trade, investment, economic and political exchange between societies (Drezner, 2001; Manshin & Ghafari, 2021; Stallings, 2007), internationalization is commonly associated with the increased influence of transnational ideas and actors on states (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000).

Despite internal debates and power struggles, major global institutions are promoting neoliberal reforms as the dominant model that is being ‘transferred’ to developing economies through aid programs and by imitation (Minogue, 2002). The examples of a quasi-voluntary or openly coercive adoption of policies and institutions in developing countries are numerous. Countries like Bangladesh, for example, adopted public-private dialogue platform BUILD, alternative dispute resolution, free economic zones through the World Bank program.¹ Tajikistan introduced free economic zones with the assistance of international development organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and others.² The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Australian Tax Office provided technical assistance to Indonesia after the latter adopted a stricter tax law model.³

In such cases, the motivation to voluntarily undertake new commitments and engage with institutions cannot be explained solely by domestic rational attempts to improve policy effectiveness. Rather, it is often motivated by pressure to comply with international requirements. For example, the endorsement and promotion of such new non-state institutions, instruments, and tools by international organizations often makes their diffusion smoother and more acceptable. The European Union (EU) is an example of both horizontal diffusion of public policy measures among individual member states and vertical diffusion through Brussels-led legislative harmonization accompanied by recommendations from international organizations that led to the adoption of new regulatory instruments in all EU countries (Busch & Jörgens, 2004).

The similar transnationally imbued path was followed in the Mexican administrative reform and in public administration reforms across Southeast Asia. The international proliferation of value added tax (VAT) at the end of the 20th century is an example of policy transfer built on changes first introduced in France in the early 1950s.⁴ Analyzing the spread and implementation of insurance by a transnational network of life insurance organizations, pension advisors, and the World Bank, M. Leimgruber (2012) traced the origins of the current insurance system back to the Swiss model. By the 1990s this doctrine was widely used without reference to its national Swiss origins (Leimgruber, 2012, p. 38). Almost all developing countries have resorted to copying “voluntary” or “coercive” mineral policy decisions in their efforts to attract investment (Cisse, 2008). Transnational networks of international NGOs have been identified as major forces promoting gender mainstreaming in public policy measures (True & Mintrom, 2001).

A global policy network including expert groups, international organizations, and multi-stakeholder platforms as a loose network of actors has managed to authoritatively shape, conceptualize, develop, and spread the integrated water resources management diffusion of norms (Kramer & Pahl-Wostl, 2014). India’s biodiversity policies were formulated under the influence of norm diffusion through the role of policy entrepreneurs as domestic actors operating within an advocacy coalition.⁵ Analyzing the environmental policies convergence in developed countries between 1970 and 2000, K. Holzinger, C. Knill and T. Sommerer (2008) find an impressive degree of convergence between countries caused by international harmonization and transnational communication. M. Potoski and A. Prakash (2005) argue that the adoption of voluntary environmental regulatory system ISO 14001 occurs in the countries when their key export markets adopt mandatory environmental standards. Similarly, a common set of education policy reforms implemented in many countries around the world “have acquired the status of global education policies” (Verger, Novelli & Kosar Altinyelken, 2012, p. 3). Even the most profound institutional arrangements such as the constitutions commonly perceived as indigenous national foundations shaped by domestic interests reflecting the views and values of nations, are also shaped by cross-border influences in the diffusion of public policies (Goderis & Versteeg, 2013).

Role of International Organizations in Promoting Neoliberal Models

Countries and public organizations, belonging to a multi-level system of governance, are subject to the influences and constraints stemming from the complex relations between various public, private and civil society actors at global and national levels (Evans, 2004). This constant interaction, combined with a growing mutual dependence on political, economic, technical, and financial support levels have caused the need for reform that do not always come from internal needs or pressures, but more often from external factors and forces operating at different levels of global governance.

The influence and impact of transnational actors — international development organizations, think tanks, and policy networks on national policy and the channels through which these transnational actors influence policymaking are a subject of broad research interest (Boas & McNeill, 2004; Deacon, 2007; Degterev, 2011; Jacoby, 2008; Kelley, 2004; Merrien, 2001; Stone, 2004; Vachudova, 2005; Weyland, 2005). For example, donors, including bilateral organizations such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID), British Department for International Development (DfID), German Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and international development organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are designed to assist in institution building, policy transfer and knowledge transfer by providing ideational inspiration, funding, technical and expert assistance, enhancing institutional and administrative capacity (Court, Hovland & Young, 2005; Hennink & Stephenson, 2005; Jones et al., 2008; Jones & Young, 2007).

International development organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) promote institutional and policy change and knowledge transfer by building necessary supporting capacity. This goal is realized through the provision of technical and financial support, the transfer of political institutions, policy advice, training, and knowledge transfer to developing countries. These transnational actors exert their influence on national policies by creating and disseminating policy ideas, providing analytical resources, publications and templates, setting norms and justifying policy change and through regular contacts with policymakers, media outreach and organization of seminars and conferences.⁶

In almost all areas of life, governments are supported and advised by supranational structures that produce and disseminate ideas and norms and bring them down to the level of nation-states. For example, in the field of labor relations, these include the World Bank, the OECD, and the International Labor Organization (ILO); in the field of health, the World Health Organization (WHO); on environmental protection, the UN Environment Program (UNEP); and major international conferences (such as Earth Summits). Such transnational actors derive their legitimacy from their own mandates (as in the case of the WHO, which is charged with developing global public health norms) or, as with many NGOs, from their performance (Uhlin, 2010).

International organizations and other transnational networks are widely involved in capacity-building of developing countries in the context of global institutional and political transfer. The concept and practice of state capacity building started in the 1950s with the idea of institution building, developed in the 1970s and 1980s in line with the concept of human resources, and since the 2000s the focus has shifted more specifically to the tasks of developing state capacity and knowledge networks (Blagescu & Young, 2006; Dementiev & Ustyuzhanina, 2016; Sumkoski, 2017). Attempts to increase the quality of public administration in developing countries have been achieved through the introduction of the neoliberal model of new public management adopted in developed countries. The spread of these changes at the global level, which stemmed from a fundamental change in public mandates, in particular the shift from trying to manage the entire economy through a command-and-control hierarchical system to providing services and creating conditions for growth (Moran, 2011; Sumkoski, 2017), is supported by a wide range of global, regional and local actors, represented by international organizations, transnational policy networks, think tanks, etc.

Political ideas based on the now dominant political-economic neoliberal ideology are being actively implanted in the broader framework of free market mechanisms, such as free choice and competition, liberalization and privatization. In the interpretation of the theory of international regimes, this widespread shift has been made possible by the convergence of public policy measures and political institutions as a result of countries simultaneously fulfilling their international obligations. However, the proliferation of new regulatory instruments often takes place in the absence of international agreements. Another explanation used in this logic is that governments voluntarily adapt their policies to what is already practiced in other countries (Margulis, 2021). The global spread of the new model of state regulation and related institutions, as well as the creation of independent regulatory agencies, is largely explained by the spread of political practices through the ideological leadership of the new regulatory paradigm, which is supported in every possible way by transnational actors.

International development organizations are actively engaged in promoting and implementing neoliberal models of governance through three interrelated and coordinated actions — institution building, public policy transfer, training, and changing the mindset of public administration officials. The Bangladesh Private Sector Development (PSD) training programs confirm these global findings in a more granular manner. Education and training programs were conducted in parallel with initial institution building and the transfer of public policy measures and political institutions, such as creating a platform for dialogue between the private and public sectors and undertaking specific policy and regulatory reforms (Sumkoski, 2017).

The implementation of institutional transfer can be either exogenous or endogenous. Exogenous institutions, either voluntary or coercive, are established, implemented, or imposed from above (Boettke, Coyne & Leeson, 2008) by other formal or informal authorities such as the IMF, USAID, or World Bank. Successful adaptation of political institutions has more to do with how political institutions emerge and are adopted, whether through direct implantation or borrowing, rather than their origins (Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, 2003). However, such institutional “monocropping” and the promotion of specific institutions with supposedly innate superiority has not always produced the desired outcomes, which becomes clear against the background of the emergence of alternative and apparently successful examples of hybrid institutions in China and other countries. As T. Domjahn (2013) argues, it will be extremely difficult for developing countries to replicate, for example, the Korean model of development by simply copying government policies and formal institutions, because the key role in the economic development of the Republic of Korea was played by informal institutions formed by Confucianism. Empirical studies of cross-national economic performance and its links with institutional reforms in transitional post-communist countries have revealed inconsistencies in confirming the relationship between particular institutional reforms promoted by the international organizations and economic growth (Dunning & Pop-Eleches, 2004).

Public policy transfer refers to the direct giving of created institutions and the process of applying knowledge about how public policies, policy institutions, and ideas in one environment can be used for their development in another environment (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Duan, Nie & Coakes, 2010). Such policy transfer can be a direct copy and paste of public policies, legislation and regulatory tools, or it can take the form of imitation/emulation, synthesis/hybridization, and ideological inspiration, involving a number of notions such as policies, institutions, ideologies or justifications, attitudes and ideas (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). D. Stone emphasizes the role of international and transnational actors in the process of public policy transfer (Stone, 2004).

Policy transfers can be achieved by policy diffusion, which, in the context of international development, refers to the diffusion of innovative policy instruments. Such political diffusion is due to intensive information flows in international organizations, whereby policy innovations are voluntarily adopted by more and more countries over time (Rogers, 2003). Importantly, diffusion is not initiated by formal obligations but by processes of social learning, copying or mimetic emulation (Jörgens, 2004; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Reinicke et al., 2000, Lazer, 2001; Busch & Jörgens, 2004).

Policy convergence studies the similarity between one or more features of policies (Knill, 2005), as barriers to the movement of goods, services, and people are removed in the context of globalization (Stallings, 2007) by introducing new and convergent policy practices into existing structures. Proponents of policy convergence point out that globalization and the pressures for change it generates explain why identical policies are used in most countries that address the same economic problems due to trade and investment competition. However, the above studies show that similarity and global convergence of policies are achieved through coercion, imitation/emulation, elite networking, political harmonization, and imposition of political practices. M. Kahler predicted a further restriction of national governments through the so-called “golden straight-jacket” of economic interdependence (Kahler, 2009).

Legitimacy of Neoliberal Models Promoted by International Organizations

In the previous decades, market-led reforms in line with the recommendations of the Bretton Woods institutions gained widespread global acceptance. Today, however, we are witnessing a growing popularity of more state-led and mixed models of development, reflecting the desire of developing countries to find models that suit them. The transfer of power from the state to independent regulators threatens the constitutionalist approach since it does not involve a transfer of authority or responsibility for results. So far, in existing democratic accountability processes, it is the government that is responsible to the citizens, which is implemented through electoral procedures. However, this transfer of powers and agencification (Scott, 2010) has led to a fundamental change that questions the centrality of the nation-state in managing key processes and resources within the country.

Has an alternative source of legitimacy been found within the framework of global neoliberalism? Those who are convinced of the imminent further erosion of state sovereignty recognize a “democratic deficit” at all levels of global governance. It is argued that legitimacy can be achieved through good governance, efficiency, transparent and inclusive procedures and accountability of supranational bodies and organizations. The legitimacy, in this case, will emerge as a result of problem solving, thus emphasizing the effectiveness of the global governance institutions (Clark, 2003). This process has become known as the transition “from legitimacy of origin to legitimacy of implementation” (d’Aspremont & de Brabandere, 2011). International organizations derive their legitimacy from the authority granted to them by their member states. In addition, so-called values-based legitimacy can be transformed into behavioral legitimacy through increased compliance (Levi, Sacks & Tyler, 2009).

It is important to note that these approaches overshadow the cornerstone principles of the neoliberal order — democracy, elections, transparency and accountability, as, having seized all the levers of world power, the hegemony of global neoliberalism no longer needs such tedious minutiae. However, efficiency and effectiveness alone cannot be the only criteria of legitimacy in designing new governance mechanisms, since legitimacy stemming from participation and engagement is equally important from a strategic and political perspective. Legitimacy has both a normative dimension (the right to power) and a sociological dimension (the acceptance of power depending on the constituency that provides legitimacy). Accordingly, it cannot be imposed or replaced (Buchanan & Keohane, 2005; Maggetti, 2009; 2010; Risse, 2006). This is key to the doctrine of the sovereign state, and it is anchored in seeking such legitimacy by those who bestow it, the people of the nation-state. Power based on legal-rational legitimacy remains the sine qua non of the rule of law. The doctrine of the sovereign state emphasizes the need to incorporate procedural justice into institutions, policies, and law enforcement practices that must be perceived by participants as just. It is also important to note that empirical research supports the thesis that procedural equity highlighted by accountable and transparent participatory approaches is more important than the outcome fairness (Tyler, 1990; Sumkoski, 2016). Furthermore, legitimacy is more about the fairness of political procedures or the distribution of benefits than it is about the positive outcomes of implementing political procedures and decisions. The behaviour of others affects individual compliance via the nature and extent of social influence exerted in society, which depends on society’s perception of institutional legitimacy (Sutinen & Kuperan, 1999; Young, 1979).

Therefore, it is legitimacy that is of paramount importance for governance, both at the state level and at the level of the new global multipolar institutions, which will ensure that the mandate to govern is given by the governed. More importantly, it creates an enabling environment for compliance through voluntary implementation of the decisions made and the reduction of transaction costs. In this way, such systems become not only legitimate and accepted, but also more efficient and easier to govern.

The Sovereign State Doctrine and Its Practical Implementation

In analyzing the collapse of neoliberal models, it is important to identify the intervention areas, the weaknesses of the current governance system, and how the doctrine of the sovereign state could address these problems by supporting nation states and restoring their ability to manage their own affairs. Clearly, the current critique of the global neoliberal system has undermined its moral and ideological foundations, exposing the root causes of its failure and near collapse. Under these circumstances, it is the doctrine of the sovereign state that is relied upon to find answers to two pressing existential questions — “what to do” and “how to do”? In this case, the historical example of communist countries focusing on criticizing capitalism without paying necessary attention to the agenda of building communism itself largely explains the inability to successfully and comprehensively implement the communist idea in practice, and serves as a vivid demonstration of the necessary algorithm of action for implementing the doctrine of a sovereign state.

Hence, the doctrine of the sovereign state goes beyond a critique of the global neoliberal model to address the “vacuum” created by the weakening of nation-states that should be urgently filled. The doctrine of the sovereign state does not simply oppose the current “false” globalism, which promotes the welfare of the minority at the expense of the majority. Its task is to uphold a true globalism of free sovereign peoples and nations with a just global economic, social and political system at the state level in which no one is left behind and which is based on the laws of nature, humanity and God.⁷ It is this doctrine that is put forward as an alternative vision of the future through its own sovereign scientific and educational platforms, its own network of alternative media, credible political, social and economic models and their promotion through educational platforms, and opposition to the current hegemony through grassroots organizations (Sumkoski, 2016).

The sovereign state doctrine does not suggest a return to the “pre-global hegemon” period. Such a return is unrealistic and impossible because of unprecedented technological and informational progress. It is nothing more than nostalgia for the “good old days.” Moreover, the doctrine of a sovereign state goes beyond the false and already essentially collapsed system of division into “left” and “right,” since they were merged by the Blair — Clinton act of the Third Way and coopted within the tight perimeters of the neoliberal globalism only to serve as political theater for keeping the false pretenses of elections and democracy (Barrientos & Powell, 2004).

The sovereign state doctrine is a sort of response to the attacks of global neoliberalism on both the former right ideology centerpiece — nations, traditions, and morality, and the former left ideology centerpiece — fairness and equality. Admittedly, in terms of defending traditions, nations and freedoms the sovereign state doctrine looks more “right-wing,” but it is even more “left-wing” in ensuring social justice and a decent life for society than the current “left-wing” positions. The lost legitimacy of the global hegemon can only be restored from the most basic level — family, community, then state and nation, moving on to a global community built on the legitimacy of nation-states, defined by shared values, culture, language and identity.

At the state level, the sovereign state doctrine may take a variety of political forms, from kingdom to republic, from democracy to theocracy, from conservative and libertarian to socialist, communist, theocratic political orientations. At the same time, each nation organizes itself and its own way of life, adhering to universal, natural and moral unifying principles of building an economically and socially just society, in which no one is left behind. The current predominant symbol and consequent semantics of the counter-hegemony in the oppressed nations has grown to sovereignism that is above the old left-right struggle within the global hegemony since it incorporates the ideological goals of both political movements and reflects the needs and desires of people to regain their self-organizing forces within the framework of the nation-state.

The operationalization of the sovereign state doctrine at the nation-state level must be accompanied by establishing a multipolar world order, which will set the vector of necessary reforms, including the restoration or replacement of the now invalid UN (Degterev & Kurylev, 2019; Kurylev et al., 2018). It is the sovereign state doctrine that is meant to formulate answers to the most pressing questions of the contemporary agenda: In what way are disputes between neighbors to be resolved? What will replace or complement the World Bank and the IMF? Will the Western-controlled exploitative system of fiat currency be rebuilt and replaced with a fair system of exchange? How will economic ties work between sovereign countries that have not previously engaged in active mutual trade and investment?

The Sovereign State Doctrine and International Relations Theory

Answers to the above posed questions are precisely what nation-states expect from a multipolar world order.⁸ Classical realist and critical theories of international relations contain some ideas on accountability and legitimacy in terms of decision-making in a multipolar world order. Clearly nation-states already ceded some of their sovereignty in the nineteenth century. But further action in this spirit is possible only if states and the nations and peoples are convinced that there is an accountable and legitimate world order that can promote both universal values and preserve diversity.

A. Dugin specifies that in its fundamental dimension, multipolarity means the free polylogue of societies, peoples, and cultures. “But before this polylogue can appear, general rules must be defined. Hence, a theory of international relations is the one that will involve an openness of terms, concepts, theories, notions, a plurality of actors, and the complexity and polysemy of expressions. Bringing together all of the above in the context of legitimacy is the theory of the multipolar world which is a theory of international relations that essentially rejects hegemony on its own grounds and calls for the creation of a broad counter-hegemonic alliance of free societies, people and cultures that will organize a world order, accepted as fair and just by its participants that created it, thus bestowing the legitimacy to it”.⁹

Theorizing the sovereign state doctrine, along with its operationalization on the ground and joining forces at the global level, is of key importance. This will help shaping the minds, consciousness, behavior and policies of people and states in building equitable and sustainable mechanisms of a multipolar world order. These emerging unifying principles of the multipolar world seem to be traditional human, natural, and moral values that define the mankind and that shine bright in the contrast to the current godless, robotic, empty lives stripped of any liberty, diversity, humanity, traditions, and moral values.

The need for a mutually beneficial multipolar world order is obvious and indisputable. States simply have no choice but to participate in its establishment. However, any model of world order that will replace the hegemony of neoliberalism will only be possible if citizens, nations, and the states that represent them, see in it an accountable, legitimate, multilateral international system capable of promoting universal human traditional values, as well as the diversity of nations, cultures, traditions, and ways of life across the world.

The sovereign economic development doctrine offers a set of tools for designing and implementing an institutional, strategic, and policy framework for the functioning of sovereign governments. It can be used to benchmark all models so that governments can choose the most appropriate one, enshrining it in their long-term vision of economic development. The national development plans and strategic documents adopted so far in most countries in the economic, social, educational, medical and other fields lack any significant sovereign policy content and seldom agreed with the people. As a rule, they have been developed by technocratic elites guided by documents from the World Bank, IMF, ADB, EBRD, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and other institutions. Contrary to the sovereign states’ interests, their implementation often does not improve the welfare of the people of the given nation-state.

Thus, a paradigm shift is needed in development policy, from the interests of globalist transnational corporations to the interests of societies. This change will undoubtedly increase the burden on states, which will have to design, plan, and implement more complex and demanding development programs.

The doctrine of sovereign economic development is of the utmost importance, but all other areas of political and social development must undergo similarly profound changes if the nation-state is to recover. Moreover, sovereign economic development is deeply embedded and interwoven with the political and social development. The partialization of these key areas and even further partialization within each of them served the tool of the global neoliberal agenda and allowed globalist policies to be pursued without widespread resistance. A sovereign economic doctrine requires the activation and utilization of all national intellectual, human and institutional capacity and resources, which must be directed toward the creation of a viable and just sovereign economic doctrine. What will this entail?

First, it is a profound ideological change with regard to the sovereign, the people of the nation-state, which will mark a change in the structure of incentives between all the economic, political and social factors that must be enshrined in founding acts such as the constitution. The current incentive structure in the neoliberal economies is unbalanced and biased towards the actors that implement the global neoliberal agenda, which harms domestic economy, its productivity, diverts natural and human resources into non-productive activities that neither create added value nor bring the welfare to the people.

Second, it is the renewal of science and education, particularly economic science, in accordance with the doctrine of a sovereign state. To implement the doctrine of sovereign development, it is necessary to ensure a reliable knowledge base and to introduce the results of renewed science both inside and outside the country through journals, think tanks, international academic networks, and most importantly in different languages. It should reach beyond and compete with the current English-only science that has been fully captured by the neoliberal agenda. This means establishing parallel system of accreditation of the educational platforms, creating a network of educational and training platforms such as training centers in addition to the existing schools and universities that are hijacked by the neoliberal global agenda.

Third, it is the formation of a profound national vision of sovereign economic development at the level of strategic documents, which will be supported by political, governing and administrative structures through consultation, dissemination of information and participation. This will be the basis for operational plans and development programs that will spell out target indicators, a system of monitoring, early warning, corrections and adjustments, and most importantly, the assessment of achievements. These documents will have impact on all sectors of the state and the society and will be supported by other sectoral development visions and strategies such as political and social development.

Fourth, it is about institutional changes and human resource development for public administration, administrative structures, the judiciary, central and commercial banking, education, and public finance, as well as incentive structures to be adjusted to fully support and implement this equitable sovereign economic development strategy.

Fifth, there should be a system of measures to support all economic actors, from individual entrepreneurs to large national corporations, by providing access to finance, know-how, physical, material and social infrastructure, innovation, technological advances, markets, trade and exports, investment, product branding, etc.

Based on this vision and strategy, the implementation of the sovereign economic doctrine should include the following components of sovereign national development: institutional development, governance and administration of economic development; building, operationalization and implementation of a just economic system; public and private investment support; sectoral economic policy and sector-unique advantages focused support; international economic cooperation; sovereign financial flows for development; infrastructure development; skills, know-how and knowledge development and human development; efficient public administration; restructuring of the public companies and business process reengineering; increasing productive and service capacity through technology and innovation; micro-, small- and medium-enterprise development; local and regional economic development; natural and mineral resources development and protection; trade and export promotion, marketing, and branding of national economy; regulation and deregulation for economic development; digitalization, e-governance, blockchain, AI.

Thus, the doctrine of sovereign economic development, with the doctrine of the sovereign state at its core, fills the de-statization vacuum left by decades of neoliberal models. This is achieved by (i) providing a broad ideological and philosophical basis and understanding of the essence of the sovereign economy, enabling the formulation of one’s own sovereign economic doctrine, and (ii) developing practical skills, knowledge, platforms, levers and tools to implement the provisions of economic theory that will enable national economies to prosper in the common interest. A similar approach is needed in the development of appropriate sovereign doctrines of political and social development.

Conclusion

Given the failure of the neoliberal development model to bring sustainable development to the nation-states, and failure to devise alternative theoretical and practical sources of legitimacy processes and outcomes in dissipation of neoliberal models, there is a need for establishing a new model that is taking into consideration the need for a sovereign development of a nation-states in the multipolar world that is currently taking shape. This analysis of how the neoliberal models have weakened the state functions is an entry point for rebuilding the skills and capacities of countries to design and implement sovereign state vision, strategy, and operational plans to rebuild the nation-states. Creating an efficient and responsive nation-state educational, scientific, thinktank, and implementation platforms as well as supporting international networks will help advance the sovereign state doctrine and help the nation-states share and exchange information, experience, knowledge in developing and implementing strategic, operational, and ideological plans. These are the areas where a lot of work lies ahead in the new multipolar world.

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